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Energy in China: Development and
Prospects
Pun-Lee Lam
1 After its adoption of the open-door policy in 1978, China’s rapid economic development
has brought about a growing demand for energy1.  The energy sector has undergone
remarkable  expansion.  In  recent  years,  structural  reforms,  market  incentives,  and
decentralisation policies were introduced to attract foreign investment in the energy
sector. In 1997, the government introduced a four-step restructuring framework for
the electric power industry to be in place until  2020.  In 1998,  the coal,  oil  and gas
industries  were  also  restructured.  In  the  current  Tenth Five-Year  Plan (2001-2005),
entitled “Developing the West”,  emphasis  is  placed on developing energy resources
(including hydropower, oil and gas) in West China and their transport to the coastal
regions.
2 China  is  the  world’s  largest  and  second  largest  producer  of  coal  and  electricity
respectively. China is also a major exporter of coal and importer of oil.  The energy
sector  plays  an  important  role  in  the  economy,  both  in  terms of  employment  and
industrial output. Major oil and power enterprises are among the largest state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). But despite the remarkable growth of the energy sector, the balance
between  energy  supply  and  demand  is  achieved  at  a  very  low  level  of  per  capita
consumption; and the country remains starved for energy.  In 2003 and 2004,  China
experienced an acute shortage of energy which severely disrupted the industrial output
of the country.
3 This article first reviews the current energy situation in China. This is followed by an
outline of the current industry and regulatory structures of the energy sector. Specific
critical  issues  pertaining  to  the  development  of  the  energy  industry  are  then
considered. The last part of this article looks into the prospects for the energy industry.
The focus of this article is to consider how these structural reforms could impact the
future development of the energy industry. 
Energy production and consumption 
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4 At present, the electric power industry is a major user of coal and oil in China (see
Figure 1). China is also a major importer of oil and exporter of coal. The pattern of
energy  consumption  has  also  changed  remarkably  over  time  (see  Figure  2):  the
proportion  of  coal  consumption  in  total  (primary)  energy  consumption  decreased
steadily  from  94%  to  66%  between  1953  and  2002,  while  the  proportion  of  oil
consumption increased from 4% to 23% during the same period. The consumption of
natural gas and hydropower has remained at a low level.
 
1. The energy industry in China in 2002
5 Coal has remained the country’s dominant indigenous source of energy. China has been
exporting substantial amounts of coal and coke, and importing small quantities of coal
mainly for metallurgical use. Imports might take a larger quantity with the reduction
or abolition of import tariffs under the WTO and further removal of subsidies provided
to state mines 2.
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2. Energy consumption in China
6 A fundamental problem in the coal industry is the regional imbalance between coal
production and consumption. Most of the coal reserves are in the northern regions of
China  while  most  of  the  consumption  takes  place  in  the  coastal  regions.  As  coal
producing and consuming regions are geographically distinct, adequate provision of
railway and coastal shipping facilities for coal transportation is crucial 3. Bottlenecks in
transportation raised the costs and prices of coal and affected the shipment of other
commodities 4. 
7 China’s second largest energy source is oil and its share of total consumption has been
growing. With the discovery of major oil fields in North China in the late 1950s, China
started to produce oil on a substantial scale and production expanded rapidly during
the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, this expansion slowed and China suffered a drastic
drop in oil export earnings as oil prices plummeted. Despite the increase in demand for
oil, oil production in China has stagnated during the 1990s. As a result, China shifted
from being an oil-exporting country to being a net importing country in 1993. Since
then, China’s external dependency for oil, measured by ratio between net imports and
total consumption, has increased over time.
8 China is rich in natural gas resources, but the country produced virtually no gas before
1957. In contrast with stagnant oil production, China’s natural gas production has been
increasing over time. Despite its continuous growth, natural gas accounts for only 3% of
the  total  energy  production  in  2003.  The  major  consumers  of  natural  gas  now are
fertiliser and chemical plants. In future, new demand for natural gas will mainly be for
power generation and domestic use. By 2020, the share of natural gas in total energy
consumption is expected to increase from its current level of 3% to 8% 5.
9 The electric power industry is a major user of coal and oil.  Since 1949, the Chinese
government has placed a greater emphasis on developing the power industry. Within
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30  years,  a  complete  system of  electric  power  industry  was  built  up.  The  industry
expanded  from  coastal  regions  to  the  interior  areas  and  from  cities  to  extensive
countryside. In the 1980s and 1990s, after China adopted an open-door economic policy,
structural reforms, market incentives, and decentralisation policies were introduced to
attract local and foreign investment in the power sector. Additional funding from the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank was also available for capacity expansion.
10 Apart from coal, oil, gas and electric power, a major source of China’s energy supply for
its rural population is biomass (crop wastes and fuelwood). Most biomass fuels are used
for home cooking, heating and agriculture. It was estimated that in energy terms, the
volume of biomass used is  approximately equivalent to that of  its  oil  consumption.
Since the 1980s, biomass use has been dropping as living standards have improved and
alternative fuels have become available to rural residents. Hydro-electric power and
biomass  are  two major  renewable  energy sources  used in  China;  the  application of
other renewable energy sources such as solar heating and wind power are relatively
insignificant.
11 In terms of total energy consumption, China is the second largest consumer of energy
in the  world  behind the  United States.  But  because  of  its  large  population,  energy
consumption per capita remains at a very low level (see Table 3).  Energy intensity,
measured as energy per capita of GDP, is high.
 
3. Energy consumption in China
Structure of the energy sectorCoal
12 China’s coal production can be divided into three main categories: state mines under
central administration, local state mines, and local non-state mines. Most of the non-
state mines are small township and village enterprises (TVE, xiangzhen qiye). Before
the early 1980s, the annual output of coal from state mines was well above that from
local state and TVE mines. Since then, the output of TVE mines had increased rapidly
and exceeded that for state mines by the early 1990s. The rapid growth of TVE mines
was  a  result  of  the  two-track  structure  of  production  and  allocation  in  the  coal
industry.
13 Prior to 1993, coal users had to buy coal from their designated suppliers in volumes and
at prices based on the national coal allocation plan. The central government set prices
for coal lower than those in the international markets. As a result of inadequate supply
of coal at low prices from state plans, TVE mines provided another source of supply on
top of the over-quota production from state mines. These TVE mines competed with
state mines for the coal markets and railway capacity for transportation. Unlike the
state mines, TVE mines did not have to bear many of the social costs of their operations
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and  other  welfare  responsibilities.  They  produced  a  higher  level  of  pollution  and
operated at a lower level of safety. The death rate in terms of death per million tons of
output in TVE mines has been higher than in state mines. Their low operating costs and
rapid expansion in coal production have eroded the market share of state mines.
14 Starting in 1993,  the national  coal  allocation was changed from mandatory plan to
guidance  plan.  The  coal  users  and  suppliers  could  negotiate  prices  freely.  The
government also relaxed the price controls in certain provinces and regions in 1993.
Price controls in all provinces and regions were removed in 1994. The government then
only  issued  guidance  prices  for  coal  used  for  specific  purposes,  such  as  power
generation.  The  removal  of  price  controls  resulted  in  substantial  increases  in  coal
prices. 
15 To avoid price cuts on the coal market and to improve the competitiveness of state
mines,  the central government attempted to restrict the activities of TVE mines by
introducing safety and pollution controls. In 1996, the government promulgated the
Coal  Law.  This  Law  covers  all  aspects  of  coal  production,  including  planning  for
resource  exploitation,  approval  of  new  mines,  issuance  of  mining  and  production
permits, safety standards and business management. In 1998, the State Council ordered
the closure of 25,000 non-state mines and 40 state mines. Some provincial governments
followed by prohibiting power companies and other major users from buying from TVE
mines. State mines were encouraged to merge with each other to increase efficiency,
and some were transferred to a single mining group under the supervision of provincial
governments 6. These policies not only helped the state mines to regain market share,
but have also had an impact on improving the quality and safety of coal production. In
the years after the closure of many coal mines, production was able to meet growing
demand and coal prices have soared.
16 The reorganisation of the coal industry aimed at separating the business functions of
the  government  from  its  regulatory  functions.  In  1998,  the  National  Coal  Industry
Bureau  was  formed  under  the  State  Economic  and  Trade  Commission  (SETC).  This
Bureau was responsible for industry planning and regulation and no longer directly
managed the enterprises under its jurisdiction. But after two years, in 2000, the Bureau
was abolished and its functions are now performed by the SETC directly 7. 
Oil and gas
17 The  Chinese  government  considers  the  oil  and  gas  industry  as  one  of  the  “pillar”
industries  that  play  a  leading  role  in  the  national  economy.  The  petroleum  and
petrochemicals  industry  was  organised  into  three  segments:  onshore  and  offshore
exploration  and  production;  manufacturing  and  refining  operations  of  refined
petroleum  products  and  petrochemicals;  and  distribution,  marketing  and  sales  of
refined petroleum products.
18 In  1998,  the  Chinese  government  restructured  the  petroleum  and  petrochemicals
industry by reorganising the oil companies and separating the regulatory functions of
the government from business functions. The oil and gas industry is now dominated by
three major groups; China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiary
PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina); China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec)
and its  subsidiaries China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation;  and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and its subsidiary CNOOC Limited 8.
19 CNPC and Sinopec are the only two oil and gas companies engaged in all businesses of
the production chain, which include onshore crude oil  and natural gas exploration,
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refining  and  marketing  and  chemical  operations  in  China.  CNPC is  engaged  in  the
exploration and production of onshore crude oil and natural gas in the northern and
western regions, with Sinopec in the eastern, southern, coastal and central regions in
China. CNOOC is principally engaged in offshore exploration and production. All of the
oil and gas reserves in China are held by these three major groups and, among them,
CNPC is the largest producer of crude oil and natural gas.
20 The rapid growth in oil  consumption in China is  related to the higher demand for
refined petroleum products and petrochemicals. The increasing consumption of refined
products like gasoline and jet fuel is due to the increased convenience of highway and
aviation traffic. The growth in the consumption of petrochemicals is due to the growth
in the domestic production of consumer products, which are made of petrochemicals.
Oil  is  transported by pipelines,  railways and waterways,  while most of  its  imported
crude oil is shipped by oil tanker to oil jetties along the coastal line of China. 
21 The oil and gas industry is regulated by a number of agencies, the two most important
among them being the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and the SETC.
The SDPC formulates and implements most of the government policies regarding the
petroleum and petrochemicals industry; it estimates production, allocates import and
export quotas, publishes benchmark prices and retail guidance prices with reference to
world  prices,  approves  investment  projects  including  Sino-foreign  joint-venture
projects  that  exceed  certain  limits.  The  SETC  is  responsible  for  co-ordinating  the
economic development of state-owned enterprises and overseeing their reform.
22 Prices of crude oil and petroleum products had been under government controls until
the early 1980s; then, the government began to liberalise oil prices. Similar to the coal
industry, a two-track pricing system was introduced: in-quota low prices and market
prices  above  production  quota.  Price  controls  were  gradually  removed  and  output
prices  were  allowed  to  adjust  to  reflect  fluctuation  of  input  costs  9.  Deregulation
resulted in higher oil  prices.  In  1994,  controls  were re-imposed on both crude and
refined products in an attempt to combat inflation. The government directly set the
prices of domestically produced oil, which did not reflect international market prices.
23 After June 1998, the government relaxed price controls by generally allowing producers
and  buyers  to  negotiate  oil  prices  themselves.  For  natural  gas  sold  within  the
government-formulated plan, the Commission fixes wellhead prices.  For the natural
gas sold in excess of the plan, producers are allowed to set prices within 10% of the
guidance price published by the Commission. Natural gas producers are also required
to submit proposed pipeline transmission tariffs for examination and approval10.
Electric power
24 Since  1949,  the  electric  power  industry  in  China  has  basically  been  under  state
ownership  and  control.  At  present,  the  state  sector  owns  all  transmission  and
distribution (T&D) networks and accounts  for  more than 90% of  power generation.
Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in different areas are vertically
integrated  and  under  the  management  of  a  public  monopoly.  State-owned  power
enterprises  used  to  be  fully  responsible  for  the  construction,  management  and
operation of the electric power systems. 
25 Over the last two decades, the regulatory and industry structure of the power industry
has been restructured several times. From the Ministry of Water Resource and Electric
Power (before 1988), it became the Ministry of Energy (1988-1993), then the Ministry of
Electric  Power  (1993-1997),  the  State  Power  Corporation (SPC)  (1997-2002),  and the
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present  structure  (since  2002).  In  2002,  the  State  Council  announced  a  major
restructuring  programme for  China’s  power  industry.  Since  1997  the  SPC has  been
divided into separate regional transmission companies and required to divest itself of
its generating facilities. Two major regional transmission companies were formed, one
in  the  south  and  the  other  in  the  north.  The  generating  assets  of  the  SPC  were
transferred to five independent generating companies. The divestiture was aimed at
reducing the dominant power of the SPC and increasing the competitiveness of other
smaller private or state-owned power enterprises in the power generation market. The
proceeds from privatising the generating assets of the SPC can be used to finance the
future expansion of T&D networks. 
26 To  improve  operating  efficiency  and  to  facilitate  the  introduction  of  market
mechanisms into  the  power  industry,  the  Chinese  government  aims  at  achieving  a
nationwide network interconnection. With the completion of the Three Gorges Hydro-
Electric Power Station in 2008/09, three strong trans-regional interconnected power
networks will be formed, based on the existing six inter-provincial grids. These are:
Northern China Interconnected Power Network, Middle China Interconnected Power
Network,  and  Southern  China  Interconnected  Power  Network.  These  three  trans-
regional  interconnected  power  networks  will  be  further  interconnected  to  form  a
nationwide  power  network.  This  nationwide  interconnection  can  help  to  optimise
generating capacity, improve reliability of supply, and facilitate peak load adjustments
in different areas.
Critical issues in developing the energy sector
27 The  development  of  the  energy  sector  is  of  fundamental  importance  to  China’s
economic growth. An insufficient supply of energy will  constrain the growth of the
other industries. Unreliable supply and high prices will  discourage the wider use of
consumer appliances and automobiles. High energy prices will also decrease China’s
competitiveness. On the other hand, energy production creates an adverse impact on
the environment. 
A persistent supply-demand gap
28 Despite the rapid growth in energy production in the last  two decades,  supply and
demand still lag behind economic growth. Since 1993, China has become a net importer
of  oil,  and  the  amount  of  imported  crude  oil  has  increased  over  time.  Increasing
reliance  on  foreign  supply  will  make  China  vulnerable  to  fluctuations  in  world  oil
markets and in the face of international political instability. Increases in import prices
of oil will adversely affect China’s balance of payments position and domestic prices.
29 The  growth  of  capital  investment  in  the  power  industry  has  lagged  behind  the
country’s economic growth 11. The problem of power shortages in China has become
more acute since 1979. In the 1970s, power shortages only occurred in a few cities in
the eastern and southern parts of the country. Shortages began spreading to the north
and the west in the last twenty years.  Since the industrial  sector consumes around
70%-75% of China’s electricity, a continuing growth of this sector is requiring China to
speed up the expansion of the electric power sector. Power shortfall has become the
bottleneck for economic development. And this has had the adverse effect of retarding
industrial production. 
30 The introduction of various reform policies in recent years has improved the quality of
coal  and  oil  products.  China’s  generating  capacity  has  also  increased  substantially.
Despite achievements, however, the problem of power shortages still exists in many
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regions in eastern and southern China. The reasons for shortages are numerous, and
are  interlinked.  These  include  artificially  low  electricity  tariffs,  insufficient  capital
investment  in  the  electric  power  sector,  and  insufficient  capacity  to  produce
generating equipment. 
Low energy efficiency
31 China’s great reliance on coal fuel has lowered the energy efficiency of the country. Due
to the wide use of low-quality coal for power generation and domestic use, the thermal
efficiency  of  China’s  energy  sector  is  lower  than  that  of  many  other  developed
countries. The reduction in the use of low-quality coal and improvement in the energy
efficiency  of  coal-fired  plants  are  indeed  of  vital  importance  to  China’s  energy
efficiency. 
32 The  potential  of  China’s  hydro-electric  resources  is  great,  equivalent  to  380GW  of
generating capacity, but only a quarter of it (i.e. 79GW) is being exploited. Apart from
the low exploitation rate, there is a problem of transmitting hydro-electric power from
the  western  part  of  the  country  to  the  eastern  coastal  regions.  In  recent  years,
increased efforts have been made in carrying out the high voltage (330/500 kV lines)
transmission projects to serve as the backbone of the regional networks. With high
voltage  transmission lines  in  place,  electric  power  can be  transmitted from hydro-
electric power stations in the western part of China to the east during wet seasons; and
this is fed back from thermal power plants in the east during dry seasons. Similarly, oil
and  gas  in  west  China  can  be  transmitted  to  north  China  and  the  eastern  coastal
regions by constructing pipelines.
 
4. Carbon dioxyde (CO2) emissions in 2001
33 China’s biggest consumer of coal is the electric power industry. The reliance on coal-
fired thermal  plants  has caused serious local  and regional  pollution problems.  Coal
Energy in China: Development and Prospects
China Perspectives, 59 | may - june 2005
8
combustion leads to the emission of  certain harmful chemicals  such as particulates
(TSP), nitrogen oxide (NOX), carbon dioxide (CO2), and sulphur dioxide (SO2). These
pollutants  not  only  affect  the  living  environment  of  China,  but  also  neighbouring
countries  including  Korea  and  Japan.  China  needs  to  design  incentive  policies  to
promote energy efficiency and renewable energy development,  and enhance its  co-
operation with the international community 12. 
34 The level of CO2 emissions in China, both in terms of total emissions and emissions per
unit of GDP, are very high (see Table 4). But because of the large population, emissions
per capita currently remain low. However, as the Chinese economy continues to grow
at a rapid rate, it is expected that the increase in energy use will have a significant
environmental  impact  on  the  global  economy.  By  2025,  China’s  CO2  emissions  are
forecast at around 18% of the world’s total emissions. Since China and India are low-
income developing countries with a large population, the Kyoto Protocol does not apply
to them as to developing countries. However, as these two populous countries continue
to develop, it is expected that there will be increasing international pressure on them
to  improve  energy  efficiency.  Both  countries  need  to  exert  considerable  efforts  to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Artificially low electricity tariffs  
35 Low energy prices have been identified as the root of China’s energy shortage problem.
In  recent  years,  coal  and oil  prices  have  been allowed to  increase  to  reflect  world
prices. In the electric power sector, however, a true pricing reform has yet to come.
The standard nationwide electricity tariffs in China remained basically unchanged from
the 1950s to the early 1980s and were far below the costs of production. Low electricity
prices  forced  power  companies  into  deficit,  which  had  to  be  financed  by  large
borrowings  and government  subsidies.  Capital  funds  were  made available  from the
government and state banks at low cost. Historically, coal was sold to the power sector
at subsidised prices, sometimes at half, or even less than half, of the cost of production.
For  existing  thermal  power  plants,  low  financing  costs  and  subsidised  coal  prices
allowed power companies to charge low tariffs.
36 An artificially low level of electricity tariffs inhibited incentives for foreign investment
and energy conservation. As China was transforming into a market economy, reform of
energy pricing was called for in order to eliminate the energy shortage and encourage
energy  conservation.  To  encourage  foreign  investment  in  the  power  sector,  the
formulation of a unified electricity pricing policy, pricing principles and calculation
formulae are of particular importance. 
37 Since the early 1980s, progress has been made in raising energy prices to market levels.
In  1985,  electricity  tariffs  were  raised  throughout  the  country.  Local  areas  were
allowed, for the first time, to raise tariffs to cover rising costs of fuel and transport. The
increases in tariffs stimulated capital investment in the power sector. The State Council
issued  a  policy,  entitled  “on  encouraging  investment  in  the  power  industry  and
executing multi-tier electricity tariffs”, which was aimed at encouraging foreign firms
to invest in the power industry 13. 
38 The Chinese government has introduced other pricing reform policies to attract foreign
investment, for the purpose of both reducing power shortages, and preventing state-
owned power enterprises from suffering persistent losses. In 1991, a “high-in and high-
out” policy was introduced, which allows electricity tariffs to fluctuate according to
fuel costs and other production costs. Significant tariff increases were granted in the
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early 1990s. From 1990 to 2000, average power tariffs tripled by the equivalent of an
increase of 12% per annum. Yet the increase in electricity prices has been much lower
than that for petroleum products (see Figure 5). Electricity tariffs remain below the
true cost of production. Occasionally, the Chinese government has to reduce the pace of
price reforms for  fear  of  stimulating inflation.  State-owned power enterprises  have
complained that they are not allowed to raise tariffs to reflect the increases in fuel
costs. The result is a deterioration in their financial performance. Artificially low tariffs
and inadequate returns continue to deter foreign investment in China’s power sector.
Insufficient capital investment
39 It was estimated that the domestic capital available for power development falls short
of projected needs by about 20%-30%. The gap has to be filled by foreign capital. The
imbalance between planned expansion and domestic capacity has also created a big
market for foreign manufacturers of generating equipment. In the 1980s, the Chinese
government  repeatedly  used  foreign  investment  opportunities  in  the  equipment
market  to  secure  technical  transfers  from  multinational  corporations.  Foreign
companies hoped that by assisting the upgrading of power equipment, they would be in
a better position to gain access to the vast potential market in China.
40 In the early 1990s, China opened its doors to foreign direct investment in electricity
generation, with the aim of reducing electricity shortages and enhancing productivity
of  power  plants.  However,  because  of  persistent  institutional  barriers,  the  actual
volume of foreign direct investment throughout the 1990s fell short of the target by a
substantial  margin 14.  Foreign investors often find it  time-consuming to negotiate a
power project. They often face difficulties in securing a loan from banks, as the Chinese
party  is  reluctant  to  guarantee  returns.  The  government  approval  process  is  not
transparent, and when growth in demand for electricity slows or when a competitive
bidding system for power dispatch is introduced, there is the risk that the conditions of
power  purchase  contracts  can  default.  In  recent  years,  because  of  the  increased
uncertainties  and  risks  associated  with  power  sector  restructuring  and  new
regulations, foreign firms have held back investment in China’s power sector.  
41 Another major reason accounting for the low energy efficiency of China’s power sector
is the government’s foreign investment policy. In China, large power projects require
the  approval  of  the  State  Council.  Due  to  the  red  tape  involved  in  the  large
infrastructure  projects,  many  foreign  lenders  and  investors  would  rather  invest  in
smaller  projects  that  only  require  local  government  approval.  The  policy  of
encouraging small power plants has sacrificed scale economies in power generation
and has led to the prevalence of small, inefficient power plants. Many of these small
power plants are not equipped with modern pollution control devices. To revert this
policy, the Chinese government is now encouraging the construction of large thermal
power plants and closing down obsolete smaller ones. 
42 As  China’s  economy  expands  rapidly,  the  conditions  for  financial  assistance  from
multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
and  foreign  government  export  credit  agencies,  will  become  more  stringent.
Consequently,  China  needs  to  attract  considerably  more  private  investment  from
abroad and to raise substantial loans in the international capital markets. To increase
foreign  direct  investment  in  the  power  sector,  there  is  a  need  for  the  Chinese
government to improve the institutional climate for foreign investment, streamlining
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the  approval  process  by  avoiding  unnecessary  time-consuming  and  arbitrary
procedures.
Unproductive state-owned enterprises 
43 The system of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was established after 1949.   Since
then,  the  state  sector  has  dominated  the  Chinese  economy  and  suffered  chronic
problems of mounting losses, huge borrowings, and low productivity. The debt-asset
ratio in the state-owned sector is too high. It has been suggested that if “hidden losses”
are  taken  into  account,  the  ratio  might  be  as  high  as  85%,  and  losses  have  been
concentrated in some sectors including coal mining, oil and gas, and machinery 15. The
SOEs had to shoulder the social responsibility of creating employment, and providing
employees  with  various  kinds  of  fringe  benefits  and  service  facilities  like  housing,
education and medical care.  As a result of this social burden, energy enterprises in
China  were  grossly  unproductive  as  compared  with  their  counterparts  in  other
countries.  Some estimates  have suggested that  surplus  workers  in  the  state  sector,
including the energy sector, could be 30% of the total workforce 16.
44 In the last decade, the Chinese government has introduced various reforms to raise the
productivity of the state sector. In 1988, the National People’s Congress enacted the
Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People. Under this legislation, the
SOEs  were  granted  independent  legal  status  and  the  right  to  make  their  own
managerial decisions to protect them from any government intrusion. They were also
required  to  take  full  responsibility  for  profits  and  losses  and  practise  independent
accounting. A Bankruptcy Law was also created, which allows chronically mismanaged
and  inefficient  enterprises  to  be  closed  down.  But  the  number  of  enterprises  that
actually  went  bankrupt  remained  very  small  until  1994.  After  1994,  the  central
government began actively to enforce the law.
45 In July 1994, the first Company Law in China became effective. The primary purpose of
the Company Law is to standardise and modernise enterprise law for both the state and
the  non-state  sector.  It  was  designed  to  restructure  the  SOEs  using  international
capitalist models of the corporate form. Under the new legislation, the SOEs are treated
as independent legal entities separate from the state, with the power to manage their
assets. The Company Law contemplates several kinds of corporation including limited
liability, wholly state-owned joint stock, or majority state-owned joint stock company.
A  joint  stock  company  can  issue  shares,  which  can  be  listed  on  China’s  two  stock
exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen), or on a foreign stock exchange 17. Later in 1995,
the government introduced the policy of “grasp the large and release the small”, which
aimed  at  turning  several  hundred  large  SOEs  into  world-class  businesses,  while
allowing the small SOEs to go bankrupt.
46 In recent years, the SOEs in the energy industry have been corporatised and converted
into “independent corporations”, which are responsible for the economic management
and planning of their respective regions. At the provincial level, energy corporations
have been formed to take over the business functions of the former power bureaux.
Following  this  restructuring,  all  energy  corporations,  whether  at  the  regional  or
provincial level, now operate under commercial principles and no longer receive large
government  subsidies.  To  obtain  new  capital  for  expansion,  some  large  energy
corporations have issued shares to private shareholders and publicly traded shares are
available to private investors, domestic or foreign. It is hoped that corporatisation and
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listing on the stock market  will  create  greater  pressure on the SOEs in the energy
sector to improve productivity.
Prospects for the energy sector
47 Under the current Tenth Five-Year Plan, the Chinese Government plans to form seven
to nine enterprises with an annual coal output exceeding 50 million tons. Major oil and
gas  companies  are  in  the  process  of  consolidation  to  raise  competitiveness  to  face
impending foreign competition.  For the power industry,  however,  the restructuring
process has been delayed by opposition from parties with vested interests. In future,
energy reforms in China will focus on power market restructuring and the creation of
appropriate  governance  structures  to  maintain  a  level  playing-field  for  energy
companies to compete in the newly restructured market.
Foreign investment 
48 To meet China’s future capacity requirements, the government announced that at least
20% of this development would still be financed from abroad. However, the proportion
of foreign capital in total capital investment in recent years has remained low at about
10%. In order to create a suitable regulatory framework governing foreign investment
in  the  power  sector,  the  Electricity  Law  confirms  the  power  of  the  SDPC  in  the
determination of specific tariffs. Although the Law allows that costs shall be reasonably
covered and returns reasonably determined,  it  does  not  clarify  the entire  approval
process and the standards for determining permissible rates of return. In 2001,  the
SDPC issued a document (No. 701) on the standards for determining electricity tariffs
and permissible rates of return. According to the document, electricity tariffs should be
based on long-run average costs and the permitted rate of return should be set at a risk
premium above the interest rate on a five-year loan. However, the document did not
provide clear guidelines for determining the risk premium.
49 To  speed  up  the  project  approval  process,  new  rules  and  laws  related  to  foreign
financing of  energy projects have been issued.  The most significant one is  the BOT
(built-operate-transfer) Notice promulgated in 1995. The Laibin B Thermal Power Plant
in Guangxi became the first power plant of this kind under the BOT Notice. In the past,
power projects in China were mainly based on the joint-venture model, governed by
the Sino-foreign Co-operative Joint Venture Law. The BOT Notice provided a new model
of contracting, which is based on established international BOT structures for pilot BOT
projects that receive the requisite central-level approvals. The Notice then lays out the
central-level approval process required for such pilot BOT projects.
50 The BOT model is designed to attract foreign investment to finance power projects in
economically less developed regions of China. However, in practice, foreign investors
still encounter a number of contractual problems when trying to negotiate BOT power
projects with the Chinese authorities. Foreign companies have to face the risk of selling
power to a few state firms that might exercise monopoly power to lower the purchase
price,  or  change  the  power  purchase  agreement  unilaterally.  Given  the  slowing  of
economic growth and power consumption, foreign investors and local government are
less interested in BOT projects in power construction. The Chinese government should
continue its efforts to design clear rules and governance structures to protect foreign
investment.
Governance structure and enterprise reform
51 In the reform process of the energy industry, there exists a problem in the delineation
of the responsibilities of central and local government. Provincial governments have
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gradually  increased  their  influence  over  energy  enterprises  while  the  central
government has lost its ability to enforce regulations and policy decisions. Regulatory
staff  at  the  local  level  are  usually  employed  by  local  government  but  to  enforce
regulations imposed by the central government. The policy and regulatory functions of
various commissions in the State Council and local government agencies are not clearly
defined. Some are reluctant to give up responsibilities and compete for resources. One
obvious example is the poor enforcement of safety regulations and the closure of illegal
mines due to conflicts of interest between local and central government 18. Hence, it is
important  for  the  Chinese  government  to  provide  a  clear  regulatory  framework
governing the energy sector. It has been proposed that China can follow the federal
system in place in the United States and Canada, in which regulatory policies of the
central  government (such as  safety  standards and inter-provincial  issues)  and local
agencies are clearly defined and enforced. A unified regulatory authority governing all
energy matters at the state and provincial levels should also be considered.
52 A similar problem of governance structure exists at the industry and enterprise levels.
Despite restructuring of energy industries in recent years, the freedom of state-owned
energy  enterprises  in  the  participation  of  domestic  and  foreign  competition  is  not
clear. For example, it is not clear whether domestic oil companies can expand to the
territories of other companies by mergers and acquisitions. There is also a lack of clear
policy guidance for domestic oil companies on acquiring foreign assets. In the absence
of clear anti-monopoly rules and guidelines for mergers and acquisitions, managers of
energy companies may act for their best interests at the expense of public interest.
Collusion  or  co-operative  agreements  between  local  and  foreign  competitors  are
possible. Without a clear institutional framework to delineate regulatory authorities to
govern competition in the energy market, monopoly power can easily develop.
53 Corporatisation of state-owned power enterprises may exacerbate the agency problem
in the energy sector. Enterprise groups continue to allow the government to play a role
in their operations despite efforts to free enterprises from government intervention. At
present, large-scale SOEs still lack independent corporate governance such as a board
of directors with the power to appoint senior management. Senior posts are appointed
by the government officials who might have close relations with the enterprises. The
practice of simultaneous employment in government, on boards of directors, and in
enterprise  groups,  hampers  the  intent  and  purpose  of  reforms  that  are  meant  to
separate  enterprise  from  government  functions.  Without  appropriate  corporate
governance, enterprise autonomy may accelerate the loss of state assets and provide
more opportunities for rent-seeking activities. 
54 To avoid undue political influence on management, it is argued that the government
has to divest its shareholding in large-scale energy enterprises. Ownership and income
rights of shareholders have to be defined clearly, so that the contractual parties are
protected and management cannot use profits from listed companies to subsidise other
unproductive businesses. There is also a need to tie the compensation of managers of
corporatised  enterprises  to  their  performance.  One  alternative  is  to  diversify  the
ownership of a state enterprise into the hands of several large minority shareholders to
avoid  monopoly  control;  this  will  create  enough  incentive  for  each  individual
shareholder to monitor its performance19. To sum up, in the process of transforming
energy enterprises from a state entity to a legal entity, the roles, ownership rights, and
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relations  between  the  state,  industrial  sectors  and  enterprises  should  be  redefined
clearly.
Impact of WTO membership
55 As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since December 2001, China has to
follow the international rules governing competition and trade. With China’s entry into
the WTO, the energy industry is exposed to the whim of the world market. Certain
changes to the competitive environment in the oil and gas markets within China are
anticipated. These changes include the gradual liberalisation of the retail business and
wholesale market for oil products to foreign competition, gradual reductions in tariffs
on imported oil products, and eventual removal of quotas and other non-tariff barriers
for imports and exports of oil products. To the oil incumbents, China’s entry into the
WTO would intensify domestic competition. In the post-WTO environment, foreign oil
and power companies pose severe competitive pressure on the incumbents in China.
The incumbents  have to  form strategic  alliances  with foreign partners  to  maintain
market share. 
56 But there is a positive side to China’s WTO entry. For example, eventual removal of
export  quotas  for  textiles  and  lowering  of  import  prices  of  consumer  durable,
particularly imported cars, will raise demand for oil products. At the same time, WTO
entry would encourage Chinese energy enterprises to explore opportunities to acquire
assets overseas.  Overseas acquisitions would be key to the future growth of China’s
major oil companies.
57 The  electric  power  industry  in  China  supports  massive  employment:  providing
auxiliary  services  in  design,  construction,  installation  and  maintenance  of  power
facilities  and  equipment.  Many  of  these  auxiliary  companies  rely  heavily  on  the
“mother” company for preferential financial and business support. Being in the WTO
will  have  a  significant  impact  on  these  enterprises.  China’s  opening  to  foreign
companies will allow the importation of advanced technology and skills. Well-equipped
companies  will  survive,  but  others,  especially  those  that  rely  heavily  on  their
“relationship” with and protection from the “mother” company will find it difficult to
continue.
58 State-owned energy enterprises have to develop a number of strategies to prepare for
the WTO challenge. To be survive, the energy industry will  have to undergo severe
enterprise reform. This will  require trimming of inefficient operations,  demolishing
monopolies, and strengthening core businesses. The issue of unemployment will need
to  be  handled  with  sensitivity  particularly  as  the  social  security  system  in  China
remains under-developed.
59 The energy sector in many countries has undergone substantial changes in ownership
and  organisational  structure  in  the  last  decade.  Apart  from  corporatisation  and
privatisation of electricity and gas industries, competition has replaced the monopoly
in the energy sector. In China, major SOEs in the energy sector have been corporatised
and are operating according to commercial principles. Some have already issued shares
to  public  and  private  investors.  The  Chinese  government  has,  for  energy  groups,
mandated a separation of regulatory from business functions. 
60 In recent years, in order to attract foreign investment and to improve the efficiency of
the energy sector, the Chinese government has introduced various reforms. The aims of
these  reforms  are  to  raise  the  productivity  of  the  state-owned  energy  sector,  to
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overcome the constraints in energy consumption and production, and to establish a
number of large enterprises to compete in the national and world markets.
61 Given the size and strategic importance of the energy sector,  China cannot directly
follow the path of  privatisation and industry  restructuring experienced in  Western
countries.  With more than ten million workers employed in the energy sector,  any
radical reforms will inevitably bring with them serious unemployment problems and
consequential social unrest. 
62 Furthermore,  the  reform  process  needs  to  be  gradual.  A  speedy  introduction  of
competition  might  jeopardise  the  financial  position  of  energy  enterprises,  which
already have high debt-asset ratios. Energy endowment of the country must be taken
into account. Until China builds up its hydro-electric power, oil and gas resources, the
country will continue to rely on coal fuel and coal-fired plants that are heavy polluters.
Open market competition might prolong the retirement of old and inefficient plants,
dwarf the growth of domestic firms, and discourage the development of new energy
projects. Reform of the energy sector must take into account both capacity constraints
and environmental impact. 
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RÉSUMÉS
Since  1978,  China’s  rapid  economic  development  has  brought  about  a  growing  demand  for
energy.  The  Chinese  government  has  introduced  a  number  of  reform  policies  to  attract
investment,  including foreign exchange reform,  pricing  reform,  legal  reform,  and enterprise
reform.  To  further  improve  the  performance  of  the  energy  industries,  the  government  has
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embarked on several programmes of industry restructuring in recent years. These programmes
will  have significant effects on the energy sector in the coming decades. This article reviews
critical issues that pertain to the development of China’s energy sector and assesses the sector’s
future. 
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